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The role of the housing market for the transmission of monetary policy has
attracted great attention in the last few years, both empirically and theoretically
(see, e.g., Mishkin, 2007, and Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008). Empirically,
the recent business cycle experience indicates that house price ﬂuctuations can
have tremendous macroeconomic consequences. Theoretically, the calibrated
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models by Iacoviello (2005),
Iacoviello and Neri (2007), Monacelli (2009), and Pari` es and Notarpietro (2008)
suggest that credit market frictions in the form of housing collateral constraints
can amplify the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy in a
quantitatively relevant magnitude. These models also imply that the extent to
which the housing market aﬀects the propagation of monetary policy is related
to the institutional characteristics of mortgage markets and therefore diﬀerent
between heterogeneous countries.
This paper empirically explores the role of housing for the transmission of
monetary policy in a panel of 12 European countries. In particular, we analyze
whether there are cross–country diﬀerences in the response of house prices to a
monetary policy shock and how these diﬀerences relate to the reaction of other
important macroeconomic variables. Indeed we ﬁnd that countries exhibiting a
strong response of house prices also show a strong reaction of output, consump-
tion and inﬂation. We interpret this result as evidence for the importance of
the housing market for the transmission of monetary policy. We also show that
the magnitude of the house price reaction across countries is correlated with
standard measures of mortgage market ﬂexibility. However, this correlation is
far from perfect which suggests that other cross–country features, such as the
share of the housing sector in overall economic activity, regulations regarding
housing taxes and subsidies or transaction costs, are also likely to be relevant.
These results are derived by estimating panel vector autoregressive (VAR)
models from which we calculate impulse responses of key macroeconomic vari-
ables to a monetary policy shock. The panel dimension allows us to concentrate
on the short time period from 1995 Q1 to 2006 Q4. We select this period since
the process of deregulation of mortgage markets has been accomplished mostly
2until the mid–1990s (Girouard and Bl¨ ondal, 2001), even though certain restric-
tions still exist. Moreover, the disinﬂationary process had been completed in
most European countries in the mid–1990s and monetary regimes had become
very similar across countries, both of which is essential in the context of evalu-
ating the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock in a cross–country study.
Notwithstanding the deepening of the European economic integration, sev-
eral institutional characteristics of mortgage markets still continue to diﬀer be-
tween countries. In order to detect heterogeneities in the transmission of a
structural shock in the context of a panel VAR model we suggest a novel data–
driven approach that clusters countries into disjoint groups according to the
impact a monetary policy shock has on real house prices. We split our panel of
countries into two groups – a strong reaction group and a weak reaction group
– that are endogenously identiﬁed by using a distance measure, which is de-
termined by the absolute diﬀerence between the cumulated impulse responses
of real house prices to a standardized monetary policy shock. This stands in
contrast to the standard procedure to preselect countries into diﬀerent groups
according to some speciﬁc housing market indicators that are a priori chosen
without knowing their relation to the monetary transmission process.
So far, a number of papers have adressed the role the housing market plays
in the propagation of monetary policy shocks. Mishkin (2007) and Muellbauer
and Murphy (2008) highlight the most important transmission channels. On
the one hand, house prices are aﬀected by, inter alia, the housing stock, credit
availability and ultimately changes in interest rates induced by monetary policy
(Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008). On the other hand, house price ﬂuctuations
have an impact on consumption decisions of households – via housing wealth
and housing collateral eﬀects – and residential investment – e.g. via Tobin’s q
by aﬀecting the value of housing relative to construction costs (Goodhart and
Hofmann, 2008).
To quantitatively explore the reaction of house prices to a monetary pol-
icy shock, many papers have employed single–country VAR models. Iacoviello
(2002), Iacoviello and Minetti (2003), Giuliodori (2005), IMF (2008) and Calza,
Monacelli, and Stracca (2006) ﬁnd that house prices across European countries
respond diﬀerently to changes in interest rates. The diﬀerences in the reaction
3of house prices are shown to be related to country–speciﬁc characteristics of
national mortgage markets. Countries where mortgage markets are more devel-
oped experience a higher volatility of house prices and a greater role for housing
in the transmission of monetary policy. However, a quantitative comparison
of the eﬀects is diﬃcult to establish because the estimates reported are often
imprecise due to low degrees of freedom.
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) suggest using a panel VAR model to increase
the power and the eﬃciency of the analysis. They assess the link between real
output, monetary variables and house prices for a panel of 17 OECD countries
over the period from 1973 to 2006. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between
these variables, which has become stronger in the period from 1985 to 2006 af-
ter mortgage markets have been liberalized substantially. Assenmacher-Wesche
and Gerlach (2008) also estimate a panel VAR model for the same set of OECD
countries over the period from 1986 to 2006. In order to assess the role of insti-
tutional characteristics of mortgage markets for the transmission of monetary
policy, they split their panel of countries into diﬀerent groups. The sub–panels
are exogenously determined by using a broad range of indicators that reﬂect
cross–country diﬀerences in the structure of mortgage ﬁnancing. They conclude
that institutional characteristics of mortgage markets across countries shape the
response of house prices to monetary policy shocks, but the diﬀerences between
the groups are quantitatively unessential.
Overall, the evidence suggests that housing in European countries plays a
role in the transmission of monetary policy, but it is diﬃcult to identify the
cross-country diﬀerences precisely. While the development of mortgage markets
is likely a source of heterogeneity, the separation of countries by means of in-
stitutional indicators is cumbersome since (i) a general agreement on which of
the indicators are most important is missing, (ii) the classiﬁcation of the indi-
cators is often arbitrary, and (iii) indicators for a particular country often have
an opposite impact on the transmission of monetary impulses. Our data–driven
approach of forming country clusters avoids these shortcomings. The results
suggest that heterogeneity of housing and mortgage markets across countries
reﬂects diﬀerences in the transmission of monetary policy, which can be ex-
plained by the amplifying eﬀects that arise from movements in real house prices
4after a monetary policy shock. Since the discrepancies are sizable, we conclude
that monetary policy should be concerned about the inﬂuence of house prices
when setting interest rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the VAR
model for a single panel of countries is presented. We generate impulse re-
sponses to a monetary policy shock to explore the reaction of real house prices
to an innovation in interest rates. Section 3 sets out our approach of identi-
fying disjoint groups of countries. We discuss the institutional characteristics
of mortgage markets across countries, describe our data–driven methodology of
clustering countries and comment our ﬁndings. In Section 4, we compare im-
pulse responses of the identiﬁed groups of countries to a monetary policy shock
to assess the inﬂuence of movements in real house prices. Section 5 discusses the
plausibility of our results against the background of a calibrated DSGE model.
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 A Single Panel VAR Model
Consider a panel VAR model in reduced form:
Xi,t = ci +
p X
j=1
AjXi,t−j + εi,t, (1)
where Xi,t is a vector of endogenous variables for country i, ci is a vector of
country-speciﬁc intercepts, Aj is a matrix of autoregressive coeﬃcients for lag
j, p is the number of lags and εi,t is a vector of error terms. The vector Xi,t
consists of four variables
Xi,t = [yi,t pi,t si,t hpi,t]
′ , (2)
where yi,t denotes real GDP, pi,t is the overall price level, measured by the GDP
deﬂator, si,t is the nominal short–term interest rate, which serves as the policy
instrument of the central banks and hpi,t are real house prices – i.e. nominal
house prices deﬂated with the GDP deﬂator. For each variable, we use a pooled
set of M · T observations, where M denotes the number of countries and T
denotes the number of observations corrected for the number of lags p.
5The VAR model is estimated via Bayesian methods using quarterly data
for 12 European countries that are mainly taken from the OECD covering the
period from 1995Q1 to 2006Q4.1 Our panel of countries comprises Belgium
(BEL), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ire-
land (IRL), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NED), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP),
Sweden (SWE) and the United Kingdom (GBR). All variables are in logs – ex-
cept for the nominal short–term interest rate, which is expressed in percent –
and linearly de–trended. The matrix of constant terms c comprises individual
country dummies that account for possible heterogeneity across the units. We
use a lag order of p = 3, which ensures that the residuals are free of ﬁrst–order
serial correlation as indicated by the LM test of Baltagi (2005, pp. 97).2
Based on the VAR model (1) we generate impulse responses of the variables
to a monetary policy shock. As in Canova and de Nicolo (2002), Peersman
(2005) and Uhlig (2005) we identify the shock by imposing sign restrictions
that incorporate the notion that a contractionary monetary policy shock has
a non–positive impact on real output (yt), the overall price level (pt) and real
house prices (hpt) as well as a non–negative impact on the short–term interest
rate (st). While the restrictions imposed on real output, the price level and the
short–term interest rate are standard (Peersman, 2005), the restriction imposed
on real house prices follows from theoretical considerations derived from DSGE
models which incorporate a housing sector and which show that real house prices
should decline on impact after a monetary contraction rather than rise.3 For
all variables the time period over which the sign restrictions are binding is set
equal to two quarters. The restrictions are imposed as ≤ or ≥.4
1Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data. Since mortgage markets in
European countries experienced an extensive phase of liberalization (IMF, 2008), which started
in the early 1980s and ended in the mid 1990s (Girouard and Bl¨ ondal, 2001), we decided to
focus on the period after the process of deregulation has been accomplished.
2See Appendix B for the results of tests for ﬁrst–order serial correlation.
3See for example the papers by Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2007), Monacelli
(2009), and Pari` es and Notarpietro (2008)
4The advantage of sign restrictions over Cholesky or Blanchard–Quah decompositions is
that we do not have to impose zero restrictions on the contemporaneous or long–run im-
pact of shocks. Short-run restrictions are typically inconsistent with a large class of general
equilibrium models (Canova and Pina, 2005), and long-run restrictions may be substantially
6Figure 1: Single Panel VAR Model: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy
Shock
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Notes: The solid lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are identiﬁed from
a Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using sign restrictions. The shaded areas
are the related 68% conﬁdence intervals. Real output, the overall price level and real house
prices are expressed in percent terms, while the interest rate is expressed in units of percentage
points at an annual rate.
7Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of the variables to a contractionary
monetary policy shock, which is normalized to unity, i.e. 100 basis points.5 The
solid lines display the median of the impulse responses and the shaded areas
are the 68% conﬁdence intervals. As the median and the quantiles were com-
puted from all impulse responses that satisfy the sign restrictions, the conﬁdence
intervals not only reﬂect sampling uncertainty, but also modeling uncertainty
stemming from the non–uniqueness of the identiﬁed monetary policy shock. The
simulation horizon, which is depicted on the horizontal axis, covers 20 quarters.
The responses of real output, the overall price level and real house prices are
expressed in percent terms, while the response of the interest rate is expressed
in units of percentage points at an annual rate. Notice that the immediate
responses of all variables are constrained after the impact so that little interpre-
tation needs to be given to the sign of the adjustment for the ﬁrst two quarters.
Real output falls after the monetary policy shock and remains below the
baseline value for around 20 quarters. The decline in the overall price level is
very persistent. The short–term interest rate remains above baseline for around
8 quarters. Real house prices display a hump–shaped response – which is consis-
tent with the ﬁndings of e.g. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008), Iacoviello
and Minetti (2003) and Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006) – and return grad-
ually to the baseline value after around 20 quarters. Considering the responses
of the overall price level and real house prices two remarks are in order. First,
nominal house prices – calculated as real house prices plus the overall price level
– decline in reaction to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Second, the
adjustment of nominal house prices is more ﬂexible than the adjustment of the
overall price level over the simulation horizon.
biased in small samples (Faust and Leeper, 1997). The sign restrictions approach only makes
explicit use of restrictions that we often use implicitly. Having a certain theoretical un-
derstanding in mind, researchers using the Cholesky or the Blanchard–Quah decomposition
typically experiment with the model speciﬁcation until the impulse responses look reasonable
(Peersman, 2005). This a priori theorizing is made more explicit with sign restrictions.
5The Bayesian estimation and the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock us-
ing sign restrictions were performed with Fabio Canova’s MATLAB codes bvar.m,
bvar chol impulse.m and bvar sign ident.m, which can be downloaded from his website
(http://www.crei.cat/people/canova/).
8We check the robustness of our results by generating impulse responses of
the variables to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing a
Cholesky–decomposition of the variance–covariance matrix of the reduced–form
shocks (see Appendix C). While the signs of the responses are identical to those
obtained under the sign restrictions approach (at least after two quarters), the
eﬀects of a monetary policy shock are less pronounced and more delayed and
the conﬁdence bands are tighter when the Cholesky–decomposition is applied.
3 Identiﬁcation of Cross–country Heterogene-
ity
So far, we have estimated the panel VAR model (1) by assuming that systematic
cross–country diﬀerences can be explained exclusively by country–speciﬁc inter-
cepts. If, however, the country–speciﬁc institutional characteristics of housing
and mortgage markets largely diﬀer, also the dynamic adjustment in response
to structural shocks is likely be heterogenous across countries. Interpreting
the reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy shock as a general func-
tion of the country–speciﬁc housing and mortgage market characteristics, the
VAR parameters should depend on these characteristics and, hence, the impulse
responses should diﬀer from country to country. Therefore, countrywise estima-
tion would be optimal. Unfortunately, the precise estimation of impulse response
coeﬃcients within the VAR framework requires a relatively large number of ob-
servations. Since for the reasons outlined above a reasonable sample does not
start before 1995, we need to construct country panels in order to increase the
number of observations by using the cross–section dimension. Before presenting
our procedure of splitting a panel of countries into disjoint sub–panels, the fol-
lowing Section gives an overview of the institutional characteristics of mortgage
markets across European countries.
3.1 Institutional Heterogeneity of Mortgage Markets
As emphasized by Maclennan, Muellbauer, and Stephens (1998) the institu-
tional characteristics of mortgage markets across European countries constitute
9a source of heterogeneity for the role of housing in the transmission of monetary
policy. Some key characteristics are summarized in Table 1, which depicts a
number of institutional indicators that potentially have a bearing on the sen-
sitivity of house prices to a change in interest rates (Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca, 2006).
Heterogeneity in the depth of mortgage markets across European countries
is reﬂected by the volume of mortgage credit relative to GDP, which varies
considerably. In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark the ratios
are relatively high, ranging between 111% and 67%, while Italy, France and
Belgium report the lowest ratios.
The access of households to mortgage credit depends on several factors
(IMF, 2008), such as the standard length of mortgage loan contracts, the typical
loan–to–value (LTV) ratio, the ability of mortgage equity withdrawals and the
capability to prepay mortgages without fees. Longer mortgage debt contracts
keep the ratio between debt services and income aﬀordable. High LTV ratios
allow households to take out more debt, while the ability to borrow against ac-
cumulated home equity allows households to tap their housing wealth directly.
The possibility of early repayment enables households to reﬁnance their mort-
gage debt in the event of an interest rate decline. Finally, the composition of
mortgages between variable–rate and ﬁxed–rate is also potentially important
(Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004). Mortgage debt contracts designed with variable
mortgage rates lower the debt burden of households when short–term interest
rates decline, but at the expense of a higher burden when short–term interest
rates rise.
The IMF (2008) distinguishes the development of mortgage markets across
countries by means of a synthetic mortgage market index to exploit the diver-
sity in explaining the role of housing for the transmission of monetary policy.6
The index is constructed as a simple average of several institutional indicators
6Our discussion on the separation of countries refers mainly to the results of the IMF (2008),
but we are aware of a number of studies – see Giuliodori (2005), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)
and Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006), among others – that proceed along similar lines.
These studies classify countries into homogenous groups taking account of several institutional
indicators. Compared to the results of the IMF (2008), the outcome is akin.
10and lies between 0 and 1, yielding that higher values reﬂect a high degree of
development, while lower values indicate that the development is minor.7
According to the IMF (2008), mortgage markets in Denmark, Sweden and
the Netherlands appear most developed, which suggests a high potential role for
housing in the transmission of monetary policy. In these countries the standard
length of mortgage debt contracts is around 30 years, the typical LTV ratios are
about 80% and mortgage products speciﬁcally designed for equity withdrawals
are widely marketed. In contrast mortgage markets in France, Germany and
Italy appear less developed, as the typical LTV ratios ranges only between 50%
to 75% and the ability of mortgage equity withdrawals is widely missing.
However, the distinction of countries by means of institutional indicators is
disputable (Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2008). First, the selection of the
indicators is subjective. Vagueness prevails in the decision on which of the indi-
cators is relevant. Second, the indicators are compiled arbitrarily. For instance
a considerable degree of judgement is required – see ECB (2003) – to decide on
the relevant LTV ratios (using the average ratio or the maximum ratio), to as-
sess whether restrictions on early repayment fees are implemented or to evaluate
whether mortgage rates are variable or ﬁxed because both terms often coexist.
Third, indicators for a particular country often have an opposite impact on the
transmission of monetary impulses. While in Belgium, for example, the typical
LTV ratio is above average, suggesting a relatively strong impact of interest rate
changes on GDP, the prevalence of ﬁxed–rate debt contracts or the impossibility
of borrowing against home equity for consumption rather attenuate the trans-
mission of monetary policy shocks. Since the classiﬁcation of countries on the
basis of institutional indicators suﬀers from these shortcomings, we propose an
alternative approach, which lets the data decide whether housing and mortgage
market heterogeneity is relevant for monetary policy transmission.
7See IMF (2008) for details on the construction of the mortgage market index.
11Table 1: Institutional Characteristics of Mortgage Markets
Mortgage Average Typical Mortgage Reﬁnancing Interest Mortgage
Debt Typical Term LTV Ratio Equity (fee–free Rate Market
(% of GDP) (years) (in %) Withdrawal prepayment) Adjustment Index
Belgium 31 20 83 No No Mainly Fixed 0.34
Denmark 67 30 80 Yes Yes Mainly Fixed 0.82
Finland 38 17 75 Yes No Mainly Variable 0.49
France 26 15 75 No No Mainly Fixed 0.23
Germany 52 25 70 No No Mainly Fixed 0.28
Ireland 53 20 70 Limited No Mainly Variable 0.39
Italy 15 15 50 No No Mainly Fixed 0.26
Netherlands 111 30 112 Yes Yes Mainly Fixed 0.71
Portugal 53 28 75 No – Mainly Variable –
Spain 46 20 80 Limited No Mainly Variable 0.40
Sweden 54 25 85 Yes Yes Mainly Variable 0.66
United Kingdom 73 25 70 Yes Limited Mainly Variable 0.58
Sources: IMF (2008), Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2006) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004).
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23.2 Data–driven Identiﬁcation of Cross–country Hetero-
geneity
Instead of dividing our panel of countries a priori according to the country–
speciﬁc institutional characteristics, we split our panel into disjoint sub–groups
by focusing on the response of real house prices to a monetary policy shock. To
facilitate an easy distinction between such country panels, we consider only two
of them, namely a strong reaction group and a weak reaction group.
3.2.1 Methodology
The allocation of the countries of our panel to one of these two groups is achieved
in three steps.
1. Step: Deﬁne and Estimate the Distance between Sup–panels To
quantify the diﬀerence between any two sub–panels of countries, we need to
deﬁne a distance measure. As we are interested in the diﬀerent impulse responses
of real house prices after a monetary policy shock, we use
d =







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, (3)
where b α1k and b α2k are the median responses of real house prices of the ﬁrst
and second sub–panel, respectively, k periods after the occurrence of the shock.
We consider the responses of up to q lags. Hence, the distance measure d in
expression (3) reﬂects the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the cumulated
impulse responses over the ﬁrst q quarters.
At ﬁrst sight, it is now straightforward to allocate each country to either the
strong reaction group or the weak reaction group. One can simply estimate all
possible pairs of sub–panels and choose the pair with the largest distance. This
approach resembles a cluster algorithm, where the number of clusters is ﬁxed and
the distance between the cluster centers (i.e., the impulse response coeﬃcients)
is maximized. However, we have to bear in mind that the impulse response
coeﬃcients are not observed but estimated. Hence, choosing the maximum
distance pair only would contaminate the choice by a considerable portion of
13randomness. In fact, we ﬁnd that there a many diﬀerent pairs of sub–panels
that exhibit similar distance measures.
2. Step: Select Pairs of Sub–panels with Signiﬁcant Distance Measure
Therefore, we proceed as follows. We estimate panel VAR models for all possible
pairs of sub–panels, which contain at least three countries to ensure enough de-
grees of freedom for each sub–panel.8 Overall the number of pairs of sub–panels
amounts to 1969.9 For all pairs of sub–panels we generate impulse responses to
a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing sign restrictions, and
calculate the distance measure.
Then, we identify all pairs of sub–panels that exhibit a signiﬁcant distance
measure, where signiﬁcance is detected as follows. Assume that the estimated
impulse response coeﬃcients b α1k and b α2k asymptotically follow a normal distri-
bution. Then the sums of the coeﬃcients considered for the distance measure,
denoted by b s1 =
Pq
k=1 b α1k and b s2 =
Pq
k=1 b α2k, are also asymptotically normal.
Under the null hypothesis that all pairs of sub–panels are identical and have the
same sum of population coeﬃcients s =
Pq
k=1 αi, the only systematic diﬀerence
in the estimation results is the size of the panel from which they are estimated.
The sums of the estimated coeﬃcients should be approximately distributed
as:












where N1 is the size of the ﬁrst sub–panel, N2 is the size of the second sub–
panel, T is the number of observations corrected for the number of lags p in the
VAR model and σ2 is the population variance that is assumed to be constant
across countries. Furthermore, assuming that the countries are independent, we
8As before, the VAR models contain the same set of variables – real output, the overall
price level, the short–term interest rate and real house prices – and a lag length of p = 3.
9Notice that in our panel the total number of disjoint pairs of sub–panels amounts to 2048
(= 212/2). Given that we consider only pairs of sub–panels containing at least three countries,
this reduces the number of pairs to 1969, since there is one combination without any country,
12 combinations with only one country and 66 combinations – (11×12)/2 – with two countries.
14can apply a classical two–sided diﬀerence test using the statistic: d = b s1 − b s2.
Under the null hypothesis, the statistic is approximately normally distributed
with mean zero and variance:
Var(d) = σ
2/(N1T) + σ
2/(N2T) = (1/N1 + 1/N2)σ
2/T. (6)
Since σ2 is unknown, we estimate the population variance from expression (6)
by noting that:
σ
2 = TVar(d)/(1/N1 + 1/N2), (7)
where the sample variance of the distance measure Var(d) is calculated from the
numerous realizations of d. Given the estimate of σ2, we construct a t–statistic
and compare it with the corresponding 95% critical value of the t–distribution.
As a result, we have identiﬁed all those pairs of sub–panels that are signif-
icantly diﬀerent from each other. If there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence at all,
we would conclude that all countries show the same house price response to a
monetary policy shock and terminate the analysis here. However, we ﬁnd 831
(634) signiﬁcant distance measures, if we set q = 4 (q = 8). In contrast to using
only the maximum–distance pair, we thus consider all the diﬀerent ways to split
the panel of countries into signiﬁcantly diﬀerent sub–panels. Thereby, we alle-
viate the problem that the impulse response coeﬃcients, and hence the distance
measure, are subject to estimation uncertainty. However, this approach in turn
raises the question how to allocate a single country to either the strong reaction
group or the weak reaction group.
3. Step: Allocate each Country to either the Strong or the Weak
Reaction Group The allocation problem is tackled in the ﬁnal step. Using
the pairs of sub–panels with a signiﬁcant distance measure we calculate the
frequency that a speciﬁc country belongs to the sub–panels with the stronger
reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy shock. If this frequency
is above a threshold that is determined below, then the respective country is
allocated to the strong reaction group, otherwise it is allocated to the weak
reaction group.
The idea behind this rule is as follows. Assume there are three “true” strong
reaction countries. Then we should expect that the distance measure is maxi-
15mized when these three countries are put into one sub–panel and all the others
in the other sub–panel. However, due to sampling error, a diﬀerent pair of sub–
panels may actually exhibit the largest distance. Using our approach, we may
at least expect to ﬁnd each of the three strong reaction countries to be more
often in the strong reaction sub–panel than any of the other countries.
To accomplish this, we derive a threshold for the frequency that a speciﬁc
country belongs to the strong reaction sub–panels. From the previous step we
know which pairs of sub–panels are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Now
we count how many times each country is in a strong reaction sub–panel. A
priorily, each country has the same chance to be a strong reaction country.
Hence, under this null hypothesis there is, for each pair of sub–panels, a 50%
chance that a speciﬁc country is in the strong reaction sub–panel. Now assume
that there are a total of Nc diﬀerent pairs of sub–panels of which n exhibit a
signiﬁcant distance measure. Then, for each country, the number of times it is
in the strong reaction sub–panel resembles a random experiment, where n draws
without replacement are taken from a population of size Nc that is composed
of 50% white (=strong reaction) and 50% black (=weak reaction) elements.
Accordingly, the frequency x – that a particular country is found to be in the
strong reaction group – follows a hypergeometric distribution: f(x;Nc,Nc/2,n),
where the number of pairs Nc depends on the total number of countries M and
the minimum size of a sub–panel.10
Finally, from the hypergeometric distribution we derive a 95% critical value
for the frequency that a particular country belongs to the strong reaction group.
If any country is selected more often, it is unlikely that this is due to pure
chance. Hence, we allocate these countries to the strong reaction group. All
other countries are allocated to the weak reaction group.
10Let us denote the the minimum size of a sub–panel by m. Then the number of pos-







. In our case, with
M = 12 countries and a minimum sub–panel size of m = 3, we have Nc = 3938 pairs. Of
these pairs, we have to estimate only 3938/2 = 1969 because, e.g., the ordering of the pair
A = {1,2,3,4,5,6},B = {7,8,9,10,11,12} or A = {7,8,9,10,11,12},B = {1,2,3,4,5,6} is
irrelevant, while ex ante either A or B could be the strong reaction sub–panel.
163.2.2 Identiﬁed Country Groups
The separation of countries according to the above steps leads to two disjoint
sub–panels that depart in the reaction of real house prices to a monetary policy
shock. Figure 2 plots the relative frequency of belonging to the strong reac-
tion group – as measured by means of the cumulative impulse responses of real
house prices over the ﬁrst q quarters – together with the critical value of the
hypergeometric distribution.
For most of the countries in our sample the classiﬁcation is independent from
the value of q. Countries like Germany, Italy and Finland are clearly identiﬁed as
belonging to the weak reaction group, whereas countries like Belgium and Ireland
are allocated to the strong reaction group for all values of q. For the subsequent
analysis we set q = 4, which corresponds to the quarter in which real house
prices reach their trough following the monetary policy shock. However, Figure
2 shows the allocation of countries is robust against variations of q between 3
and 8 quarters. The classiﬁcation of countries yields that Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are settled in the
strong reaction group, as in these countries the reaction of real house prices to
a monetary policy shock is signiﬁcantly more pronounced. In contrast Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain belong to the weak reaction group
because their relative frequency is below the critical value.11
This classiﬁcation is also robust against the choice of the critical value of the
two–sided diﬀerence test applied in the second step of the allocation algorithm.
Given our assumption that the estimated impulse response coeﬃcients asymp-
totically follow a normal distribution, we tested the signiﬁcance of the distance
measure by calculating a t–statistic and comparing it with the 95% critical value
of a t–distribution (which is equal to 1.8125 with N1 + N2 − 2 = 10 degrees of
freedom). However, as the small sample validity of the asymptotics is problem-
atic, it is not clear whether the distance measure really follows a t–distribution.
11For q = 4 our approach leads to the following ranking of countries as measured by the re-
spective relative frequency: Ireland (94.12%), Denmark (64.59%), Belgium (63.99%), Sweden
(60.50%), the Netherlands (57.86%), the United Kingdom (54.74%), Spain (46.10%), Finland
(37.70%), France (37.45%), Germany (31.81%), Portugal (27.61%) and Italy (22.81%). Notice
that the 95% critical value of belonging to the strong reaction group is 52.58%.
17Figure 2: Frequency of Belonging to the Strong Reaction Group
































































































Notes: The bars show the frequency of belonging to the strong reaction group in percent. The
quarters q over which the impulse responses of real house prices are accumulated, are depicted
on the horizontal axis. Out of the total of 1969 pairs of sub–panels, the number of disjoint
sub–panels n, which show a signiﬁcant distance measure, falls from 1165 for q = 1 to 655 for
q = 20. The horizontal line shows the critical value of the hypergeometric distribution, which
slightly increases from 52.02% for q = 1 to 52.98% for q = 20. If the frequency is greater
or equal than the critical value, the frequency with which a country appears in the strong
reaction group is signiﬁcant.
18To see if our classiﬁcation depends on the choice of the critical value, we re–ran
the three–step allocation algorithm using a 90% critical value of a t–distribution
(which is equal to 1.3722) and a 99% critical value of a t–distribution (which is
equal to 2.7638). Figure 9 in Appendix D shows that if the true critical value
of the unknown distribution lies somewhere between these two critical values
of the t–distribution, the allocation of the countries to the two groups remains
unchanged for values of q = 3 to 8.
Even though our classiﬁcation of countries is roughly in line with the mort-
gage market index of the IMF (2008), some important diﬀerences are in order
(see Figure 3). First, the rankings of countries are diﬀerent. We obtain for Ire-
land the highest relative frequency, followed by Denmark, Belgium and Sweden,
while the mortgage market index assigns Denmark the highest value, followed
by the Netherlands and Sweden. Second, the composition diﬀers. We ﬁnd that
Ireland and Belgium are settled in the strong reaction group, although both
countries obtain relatively low values in the mortgage market index.
We interpret our ﬁndings as an indication that the development of mortgage
markets across countries is important in shaping the reaction of house prices to
a monetary policy shock, but additional country–speciﬁc characteristics, such
as national traditions, cultural factors, the share of the housing sector in overall
economic activity, the number of employees in the construction sector, regula-
tions regarding housing taxes and subsidies or transaction costs might also be
relevant (see for example ECB, 2003).
4 Results
What are the macroeconomic consequences of mortgage market heterogeneity
across countries? To address this question we re–estimate a panel VAR model for
the strong reaction group and the weak reaction group separately and compare
the responses of the variables to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed
by imposing sign restrictions.12 Figure 4 reports the impulse responses of the
variables in both groups together with the conﬁdence regions of the responses
12Again, every VAR model is estimated with a lag length of p = 3.
19Figure 3: Comparison with IMF Mortgage Market Index


































































Notes: The vertical axis depicts the relative frequency of belonging to the strong reaction
group as measured by means of the cumulative impulse responses of real house prices over the
ﬁrst q = 4 quarters. For the IMF Mortgage Market Index see also Table 1. Note that the
IMF does not calculate the index for Portugal.
resulting from the estimation of the weak reaction group, which are marked by
the shaded areas. While some of the median impulse responses of the two sub–
panels are statistically not diﬀerent (in particular the initial response of the
overall price level), the diﬀerences are quantitatively signiﬁcant in any case.
In both sub–panels real output falls after the monetary policy shock, but
the decline in the strong reaction group is more than twice as large on impact
(−3.5% versus −1.5%) and remains signiﬁcantly more pronounced over the en-
tire simulation horizon. The fall of prices in the strong reaction group is also
larger on impact (−2% versus −1%) and the price level remains signiﬁcantly
below that of the weak reaction group. The reaction of the short–term interest
rate to a monetary policy shock is almost identical for both sub–panels, which
ensures that the diﬀerences in the responses of the remaining variables in the
VAR models are not due to a diﬀerent evolution of the short–term nominal in-
20terest rate.13 The reaction of real house prices in both sub–panels also diﬀers
substantially and signiﬁcantly as the drop in the strong reaction group is two
times larger on impact (−6% versus −3%) and still three times larger after four
quarters (−15% versus −5%) when the house price response reaches its trough.
The ﬁndings exhibit that the adjustment of the variables in both groups of
countries depart – to some extent even substantially – after a monetary policy
shock. The heterogeneity across countries seems to reﬂect the diﬀerences in
the transmission of monetary policy, which can be related to the amplifying
inﬂuence of house prices in propagating monetary policy shocks. We interpret
the discrepancy in the adjustment as sizable enough to conclude that monetary
policy should be concerned about movements in real house prices when setting
interest rates.
In order to get a deeper insight in the way the monetary policy shock is
transmitted to the macroeconomy, we estimate an extended panel VAR model
for both sub–panels, which includes an additional variable that potentially plays
a role for the propagation mechanism. The vector of endogenous variables for
country i is given by:
Xi,t = [yi,t pi,t si,t hpi,t zi,t]
′ , (8)
where (zi,t) is the additional variable of interest, which is either given by real
private consumption, real residential investment or the mortgage rate. The
variables summarized by (zi,t) are expressed in logs – except for the mortgage
rate that is in percent – and linearly detrended.
The inclusion of private consumption by households follows from the idea
that spending plans are likely aﬀected by movements in house prices due to
housing wealth and housing collateral eﬀects (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008).
Households may increase their consumption expenditures in response to an in-
crease in housing wealth induced by a shift of house prices.14 Additionally,
13As before the monetary policy shock is normalized to unity, i.e. 100 basis points.
14It is, however, important to note that an increase in housing wealth is diﬀerent from a
rise in ﬁnancial wealth. As housing fulﬁlls a dual role, serving as both a real asset and a
commodity yielding service, an increase in the value of housing assets causes a redistribution
of wealth within the household sector. Therefore the impact on consumption expenditure
arising through wealth eﬀects should be limited (Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008).
21Figure 4: Impulse responses of country groups
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Notes: The solid (dashed) lines denote the median of the impulse responses of the strong
(weak) reaction group. The shaded areas refer to the 68% conﬁdence intervals resulting from
the estimation of the weak reaction group. All impulse response functions are identiﬁed from
a Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using sign restrictions. Real output, the
overall price level and real house prices are expressed in percent terms, while the interest rate
is expressed in units of percentage points at an annual rate.
22households may rise their consumption expenditures because of an easier access
to credit, since an increase in house prices extends the value of collateral, which
loosens credit constraints. The strength of both eﬀects depends – inter alia – on
the sensitivity of house prices to a change in interest rates. Residential invest-
ment may be stimulated by an increase in house prices, primarily because the
value of housing rises relative to construction costs. Finally, including the mort-
gage rate accounts for the speed with which debt contracts conditions adapt to
a change in interest rates.
We assess heterogeneity across the two sub–panels by focusing on the reaction
of the additional variables to a monetary policy shock.15 The impulse responses
are plotted in Figure 5, together with the conﬁdence regions of the responses
resulting from the estimation of the weak reaction group, which are marked by
the shaded areas.
Figure 5: Extended VAR Model Speciﬁcations















































Notes: The solid (dashed) lines denote the median of the impulse responses of the strong
(weak) reaction group. The shaded areas refer to the 68% conﬁdence intervals resulting from
the estimation of the weak reaction group. All impulse response functions are identiﬁed from a
Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using sign restrictions. Private consumption
and residential investment are expressed in percent terms, while the mortgage rate is expressed
in units of percentage points at an annual rate.
15In line with the four–variable VAR model we impose a non–positive reaction on private
consumption and residential investment and a non–negative reaction on mortgage rates over
the ﬁrst two quarters following the monetary policy shock.
23The ﬁndings exhibit that real private consumption in both sub–panels re-
sponds diﬀerently to a monetary policy shock, as the fall in the strong reaction
group is signiﬁcantly more pronounced. This suggests that the reaction of pri-
vate consumption is aﬀected by the volatility of real house prices due to wealth
and collateral eﬀects. The response of real residential investment in both sub–
panels seems to be alike, except for the reaction in the ﬁrst year following the
shock, where the reduction is larger in the strong reaction group than in the
weak reaction group.
Mortgages rates in both sub–panels move diﬀerently. While in the strong re-
action group mortgage rates overshoot the increase in short–term interest rates,
the adjustment in the weak reaction group is only incomplete and more persis-
tent, indicating a slower pass–through of changed reﬁnancing costs to mortgage
rates. While this discrepancy in the adjustment of mortgage rates might be
attributable to diverging debt contract terms, it turns out, however, that in the
two sub–panels both, variable–rate and ﬁxed–rate contracts, co–exist (see Table
1).
5 Plausibility of the Estimated Eﬀects of Hous-
ing Market Heterogeneity
The extent to which the real economy is aﬀected by a monetary policy shock
does not only depend on the degree of ﬁnancial frictions. Non–neutrality of
monetary policy is possibly also related to other sources of rigidities, such as
the stickiness of prices and wages or adjustment costs on the markets for labor
and investment goods. An empirical impulse response analysis is hardly able to
distinguish between these diﬀerent sources and to draw clear inference about the
true structural reasons behind the diﬀerences in the response of macroeconomic
variables to a monetary policy shock. Even though we have shown that real
output co–moves with real house prices following a monetary policy shock and
that there exists a positive correlation between the amplitude of the two impulse
response functions, heterogeneity in the extent of other rigidities may also play
a certain role in shaping the cross–country diﬀerence of the impulse responses.
24Therefore, we evaluate the plausibility of our estimated eﬀects of housing
market heterogeneity by comparing the empirical impulse responses with im-
pulse responses obtained from a calibrated New Keynesian DSGE model that
incorporates a housing sector. We refer to the model of Iacoviello (2005), which
includes two frictions that render monetary policy non–neutral: a borrowing
constraint (` a la Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) on the part of entrepreneurs, who
produce an intermediate good in a competitive market by using real estate and
labor as inputs, and nominal price stickiness (` a la Calvo, 1983) on the part of
the retailers, who produce a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good under monopolistic com-
petition using the intermediate good as an input.
Our exercise proceeds in two steps. In a ﬁrst step, we quantify the eﬀects of
mortgage market heterogeneity by simulating the model with two LTV ratios,
50% (which corresponds to the lowest ratio in our panel of countries, see Table
1) and 100% (which is still below the highest ratio in our panel of countries),
and a ﬁxed probability of not changing prices (θ = 0.75).16 We are particularly
interested in the diﬀerences between the impulse responses of real output and
real house prices to a monetary policy shock. In a second step, we perform
the same exercise with a ﬁxed LTV ratio (89%) and diﬀerent degrees of price
stickiness. Based on evidence from surveys among ﬁrms, ´ Alvarez (2008) reports
that the mean duration of price changes in our panel of countries varies between
8.2 months in the United Kingdom (implying θ = 0.63) and 13.5 months in
Germany (implying θ = 0.77).17 Figure 6 summarizes the results by showing
the diﬀerences of the theoretical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the calibration exercise. First, the higher
the LTV ratio (i.e. the less the entrepreneurs are credit constrained), the larger
the immediate eﬀects of an unexpected 1% monetary policy contraction on real
house prices and real output. The eﬀects are sizeable and are of comparable
16Except for the LTV ratio the calibration is identical with Iacoviello (2005). The impulse
responses were computed using the “basic” model of Iacoviello (2005). In contrast to the
“full” model, ﬁnancial frictions only apply to entrepreneurs, and the use of capital is excluded
from the production process. Moreover, in order to isolate the mechanism of the ﬁnancial
accelerator, the central bank is assumed to not respond to movements in output.
17Notice that in the work of ´ Alvarez (2008) comparable information on price stickiness in
Ireland, Denmark and Finland is missing.
25Figure 6: Evidence from a DSGE Model















Real house price differential
(LTV=100%) minus (LTV=50%) (q=0.77) minus (q=0.63)
Notes: The solid (dashed–dotted) lines show the diﬀerence between the impulse responses to
a contractionary 1% monetary policy shock obtained from the basic Iacoviello (2005) model
with a strong ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism (a high degree degree of price stickiness θ)
and those obtained from the same model with a weak ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism (a low
degree degree of price stickiness θ). The values on the vertical axis are units of percentage
points.
magnitude to our empirical results, at least in the ﬁrst quarters following the
shock. In case of a LTV ratio of 100% real output declines by 1.5 percentage
points more than in case of a LTV ratio of 50%. Likewise the drop in real
house prices is much more pronounced in case of a stronger ﬁnancial accelerator.
Thus, heterogeneity in the characteristics of mortgage markets are likely to have
a substantial impact on the real eﬀects of monetary policy. Second, the stickier
prices are, the larger is the immediate eﬀect of an unexpected 1% monetary
policy contraction on real house prices and real output. In case of a high degree
of price stickiness real output and real house prices decline by 0.4 percentage
points more on impact than in case of a low degree of price stickiness. Thus,
diﬀerences in the degree of price stickiness are also likely to be a source of
divergences in the transmission of monetary policy.
Since both frictions have similar implications for the cross–country diﬀer-
ences of monetary policy eﬀects, an empirical impulse–response analysis alone
is unable to discriminate between the sources of these diﬀerences, irrespective
26Figure 7: Eﬀects of Monetary Policy on Real House Prices and Price Stickiness


































































Notes: The vertical axis depicts the relative frequency of belonging to the strong reaction
group as measured by means of the cumulative impulse responses of real house prices over the
ﬁrst q = 4 quarters. The horizontal axis shows the mean duration of price changes in months,
which is taken from ´ Alvarez (2008). Note that data for Ireland, Denmark and Finland is
missing.
of whether real house prices are included in the VAR model or not. In order to
rule out that diﬀerent degrees of price stickiness drive our results, we plotted the
relative frequency of belonging to the strong reaction group against the mean
duration of price changes (see Figure 7). The negative relationship implies that
in countries with a strong real house price and real output response to a mone-
tary policy shock prices are more ﬂexible than in the countries belonging to the
weak reaction group. If anything, then cross–country diﬀerences in the degree of
price stickiness should attenuate the diﬀerences between the impulse responses
in the two country groups, rather than being their source.
276 Concluding Remarks
We explore the role of housing market heterogeneity in European countries for
the transmission of monetary policy. We estimate a panel VAR model to gen-
erate impulse responses of key macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy
shock taking special account of the reaction of real house prices. Our panel
comprises 12 countries for which we use quarterly data over the period from
1995 to 2006.
We ﬁnd that key macroeconomic variables in European countries co–move
with real house prices after a monetary policy shock. In order to assess the
impact of housing and mortgage market heterogeneity across countries we split
our panel into two disjoint groups – a strong reaction group and a weak reac-
tion group – using a data–driven approach that takes account of the reaction
of real house prices to a monetary policy shock. This is in contrast to the ex-
isting literature – notably to Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) – which
typically splits the panel a priori using a broad range of indicators that reﬂect
cross–country diﬀerences in the structure of housing and mortgage markets.
A comparison of the impulse responses of the two groups yields that quan-
titatively signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist. The reaction of macroeconomic variables
in the strong reaction group (including Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, Belgium and the United Kingdom) is more pronounced than in the weak
reaction group (including Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal),
which suggests that real house prices play an amplifying role in the propagation
of monetary policy shocks. Our result stands in contrast to Assenmacher-Wesche
and Gerlach (2008) who ﬁnd that institutional characteristics of mortgage mar-
kets across countries shape the response of house prices to monetary policy
shocks, but the diﬀerences between the groups are quantitatively unessential.
As regards the discrepancies of the responses of major macroeconomic variables
after a monetary policy shock across our groups of countries, we conclude that
monetary policy should take account of the volatility of real house prices when
setting interest rates.
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We use data for 12 European countries that is mainly taken from the OECD
covering the period from 1995Q1 to 2006Q4. The panel of countries includes
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The data refers to the OECD
Economic Outlook Nr. 84 database and comprises:
1. Real output (yt): Gross domestic product, volume, market prices, season-
ally adjusted.
2. Overall price level (pt): Gross domestic product, deﬂator, market prices,
seasonally adjusted.
3. Interest rate (st): Short-term interest rate in percent.
4. Real house prices (hpt): Nominal house prices provided by the OECD, de-
ﬂated with the GDP deﬂator, seasonally adjusted. Nominal house prices
for Belgium and Portugal are taken from the Bank of International Set-
tlement (BIS) database.
5. Private consumption: Private ﬁnal consumption expenditure, volume, sea-
sonally adjusted.
6. Residential investment: Private residential ﬁxed capital formation, vol-
ume, seasonally adjusted. Since residential investment is not available for
Portugal we used the gross ﬁxed capital formation, volume, seasonally
adjusted, instead.
7. Mortgage rate: National mortgage rates are taken from the European
Central Bank (www.ecb.org).
32B Tests for Serial Correlation
Following Baltagi (2005), we adopt an LM test for ﬁrst-order serial correlation.
The results of the tests, which are summarized in Table 2, show that the model
appears to be well speciﬁed.
Table 2: Univariate LM Tests for Serial Correlation





Notes: Results of an LM Test for ﬁrst-order serial correlation. See Baltagi (2005, pp. 97).
C Single Panel VAR Model: Alternative Identiﬁcation
Scheme
We check the robustness of our results by generating impulse responses of the
variables to a monetary policy shock, which is identiﬁed by imposing a Cholesky–
decomposition of the variance–covariance matrix of the reduced–form shocks
(Sims, 1980). The ordering of variables in the vector Xi,t implies that real
output and the overall price level are hit by an innovation in the nominal short–
term interest rate with a lag of one quarter, while real house prices are aﬀected
contemporaneously. The impulse responses of the variables are shown in Figure
8 together with the corresponding error bounds.
The ﬁndings show that real output falls after two quarters following a mon-
etary policy shock, exhibiting a humped–shaped response, and returns to the
baseline value subsequently. Prices fall immediately. Real house prices slightly
increase on impact after a monetary policy shock, but the rise is statistically
insigniﬁcant. They decline afterwards, reaching their trough after around 8
quarters, and return to the baseline value subsequently.
While the identiﬁcation strategy seems to be irrelevant for the response of
the short–term nominal interest rate, a comparison of the remaining impulse
33Figure 8: Alternative Identiﬁcation Scheme
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Notes: The solid lines denote the median of the impulse responses, which are identiﬁed from
a Bayesian vector–autoregression with 1000 draws using a triangular decomposition of the
variance–covariance matrix of the reduced–form shocks. The shaded areas are the related 68%
conﬁdence intervals. Real output, the overall price level and real house prices are expressed in
percent terms, while the interest rate is expressed in units of percentage points at an annual
rate.
34responses with those resulting from the sign restriction approach yields some
important diﬀerences. Using the triangular decomposition the eﬀects of a mon-
etary policy shock are less pronounced and more delayed (see Peersman, 2005,
and Bjørnland and Jacobsen, 2008, for similar results). Under sign restrictions
an unexpected 100 basis point increase in the policy instrument depresses real
output instantaneously by almost 3%, whereas the triangular decomposition
leads to a decline in real output by slightly less than 1% after two years. The
maximum impact on the overall price level using the triangular decomposition is
−0.3% in the third year following the shock, compared to −2.0% in the second
year under sign restrictions. Likewise, the fall in real house prices is about seven
times larger under sign restrictions.
Moreover, the conﬁdence bands are tighter when the triangular decomposi-
tion is applied. Since the triangular decomposition is unique, there is no un-
certainty stemming from the identiﬁcation of the monetary policy shock. Thus,
the conﬁdence intervals exclusively reﬂect sampling uncertainty, which is re-
lated to the Bayesian estimation of the coeﬃcients of the reduced–form VAR
model. Under the sign restriction approach the uncertainty surrounding the
impulse response functions increases due to the existence of multiple orthogonal
decompositions of the variance–covariance matrix, which satisfy the imposed
sign restrictions.
35D Robustness of the Allocation Algorithm
Figure 9: Frequency of Belonging to the Strong Reaction Group
































































































































































































Notes: The left (right) panel shows the frequencies of belonging to the strong reaction group, if the critical value of the two–sided
diﬀerence test is equal to 1.3722 (2.7638).
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